NEW YORK
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REGULATING THE REGULATOR
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AT NYSE
The CII reported that the directors on the board were too busy to devote
required time to regulatory matters. It was pointed out that most of the
directors were top executives of the companies and they had their own
businesses to look after. The CII report stated, "Board members have too many
connections among themselves to be effective."[1] For instance, Grasso was
inducted into the board of Home Depot Inc, while Home Depot's co-founder Ken
Langone was a director at NYSE.
Analysts felt that conflict of interests in the roles played by the members of
the BoD was one of the main reasons for misgovernance at NYSE. The role of the
directors was to maintain free and fair market environment and ensure high
standards of working to safeguard interest of public. But, analysts were
doubtful about the performance of the board.
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It was pointed out that the role played by the members of the BoD came in conflict with
their primary business. Half of the directors who represented the board
did business on the exchange and other half were the ones whose companies
were listed on the exchange or shared close relationship with companies
listed. Commenting on the role of non-industry directors Fortune wrote,
"But these people don't wake up each morning wondering how they can
protect investors - they wake up thinking about how to make money for
their companies, a noble goal to be sure, but not exactly the watchdog
role the securities market might like."[2] Commenting on the role
conflict, said Robert Mittelstaedt, Vice dean and director - executive
education, Wharton school, "They are fundamentally different activities.
You can't be both a regulator and an organization that is trying to draw
companies [as members] and make it attractive for them to function on the
exchange."[3] |
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THE ROLE OF SPECIALISTS
The specialist system at NYSE attracted considerable
criticism. In April 2003, the SEC initiated an investigation against trading
violations committed by the specialists. The specialists were alleged to be
involved in front running[4] . However, NYSE refuted the charges and said that
SEC was inquiring over violation of negative-obligation rule[5] . But analysts
pointed out that the objective of the inquiry remained the same though the
rules violated differed. The primary question which NYSE needed to answer was
whether, its specialists purchased shares at lower price with an intention to
sell them afterwards for profit. The firms which faced the investigation
included - Spear, Leeds & Kellogg (subsidiary of Goldman Sachs), Fleet Boston
Financial, Bear Wagner (partly owned by Bear Stearns), LaBranche and Van der
Moolen.
This was not the first time the specialist system had come under scrutiny. In
1999, NYSE entered into a settlement with the SEC to make the specialist system
more transparent.[6] However, with fresh allegations against specialists
surfacing again in 2003, analysts felt that not much was done to bring in
transparency in the system. It was reported that in the early 2000s, when
businesses were reeling under pressure due to slowdown, specialist firms at
NYSE posted pre-tax profit margin of 35-37% against the 9.7% margin of the
corporate America. This raised questions about the working methods of
specialists. Many felt that specialists took unfair advantage of the exclusive
knowledge of investor orders.
Further, analysts were also critical about execution of orders at NYSE.
Investors could not execute their buy/sell orders immediately as they were
required to go through specialists or floor brokers paying high commissions. THE FINAL ASSAULT-CEO COMPENSATION
NYSE also faced increased criticism because it did not
reveal its executive compensation figures. With increasing pressure from media
and SEC, NYSE announced the executive compensation figures in August 2003. It
announced that Grasso was paid lump sum amount of $140 million for his services
and his employment contract was extended up to the year 2007. Further the
exchange also revealed that Grasso would be receiving around $1.4 million as
salary per year and a bonus of $1 million per year. In addition, NYSE also
announced that Grasso was entitled to receive around $48 million in future as
benefits. Grasso's pay package attracted criticism from all quarters. Due to
increasing criticism, Grasso announced that he would not take $48 million.
Grasso's pay package was publicly criticized by Donaldson. Donaldson issued a
statement saying that Grasso's pay package raised doubts about the NYSE
administration and asked NYSE to submit the minutes of the meetings in which
Grasso's compensation was finalized. Meanwhile, Washington Post[7] reported
that members of the executive compensation committee were appointed by Grasso
himself. The composition of the compensation committee also received serious
criticism. Many were critical that the compensation committee comprised of
executives from the companies which were regulated by the NYSE. Further Fortune
reported that one of the NYSE directors through an email claimed that board
members who were not in compensation committee never knew the breakdown of the
Grasso's pay deal[8].
Refuting the allegations about the executive compensation, NYSE said that it
acted on the advice of HR consultants. It was reported that NYSE took advice
from Hewitt Associates[9] regarding Grasso's compensation and the exchange had
hired an independent consultant - Vedder Price[10] to assess the compensation
of Grasso. Analysts felt that Grasso's pay package should be in lines with the
salary drawn by the chief of SEC and cited that SEC chief earned around
$142,500 per annum. But some felt that there was nothing wrong in NYSE chief
earning on par with the top financial services industry executives. However,
analysts considered Grasso's pay package high even when compared to the salary
earned by the top executives in the financial services industry.
Grasso's pay package even attracted criticism from the NYSE insiders. The
members of the exchange were furious that while the operating income and volume
of trade on the exchange were declining; Grasso was rewarding himself with such
hefty amount. It was reported that the cost of operating on NYSE had increased
by over 30% during 2000-2003. The public resentment against Grasso further
increased with two large pension funds in the US criticizing his pay package
and demanding his resignation. With mounting pressure, Grasso resigned in
September 2003.
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THE CLEAN UP EXERCISE
[1]English, Simon, Wall
Street report slams 'cosy' NYSE, www.telegraphic.co.uk, August 8, 2003.
[2]Lashinsky, Adam, NYSE: Who's Minding the
Store? Fortune, March 24, 2003.
[3]How to Restore Credibility at the NYSE,
www.knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu, September 24, 2003
[4]An illegal activity in
which a trader takes a position in an equity in advance of an action which
he/she knows his/her brokerage will take that will move the equity's price in a
predictable fashion.
[5]The negative obligation ensures that
specialists do not get involved in the market on their own behalf when the
market is able to "make itself" and sufficiently match buyers with sellers. This
obligation on the specialists provides the public an opportunity to transact
with one another without the intervention of the specialists.
[6]The SEC was investigating the charges of
violations by specialists' way back in early 1990s As a result of SEC
investigation, one floor broker was banned from the securities industry.
[7]Leading US
newspaper.
[8]Tully, Shawn, See Dick Squirm, Fortune, September 15, 2003.
[9]Established in 1940, Hewitt Associates is a global outsourcing and consulting
firm delivering a complete range of human capital management services.
[10]Founded in 1952, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, P.C is a law firm. The firm
advices organizations on the corporate responsibility and other relating
matters.
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