Xerox: The Benchmarking Story
	
 
		
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Case Details:
  
Case Code : OPER012 
Case Length : 14 Pages 
Period : 1982 - 2002 
Organization : Xerox 
Pub Date : 2006 
Teaching Note : Available 
Countries : USA 
Industry : Office Automation 
 
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Background Note Contd...
	
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In 1969, it set up a corporate R&D facility, the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), 
to develop technology in-house. In the 1970s, Xerox focused on introducing new 
and more efficient models to retain its share of the reprographic market and 
cope with competition from the US and Japanese companies. 
 
While the company's revenues increased from $ 698 million in 1966 to $ 4.4 
billion in 1976, profits increased five-fold from $ 83 million in 1966 to $ 407 
million in 1977. As Xerox grew rapidly, a variety of controls and procedures 
were instituted and the number of management layers was increased during the 
1970s. 
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 This, however, slowed down decision-making and resulted in major delays in 
	product development. In the early 1980s, Xerox found itself increasingly 
	vulnerable to intense competition from both the US and Japanese competitors. 
	According to analysts, Xerox's management failed to give the company 
	strategic direction. 
	 
	It ignored new entrants (Ricoh, Canon, and Sevin) who were consolidating 
	their positions in the lower-end market and in niche segments. The company's 
	operating cost (and therefore, the prices of its products) was high and its 
	products were of relatively inferior quality in comparison to its 
	competitors. Xerox also suffered from its highly centralized decision-making 
	processes.  
	
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		As a 
		result of this, return on assets fell to less than 8% and marketshare in 
		copiers came down sharply from 86% in 1974 to just 17% in 1984. Between 
		1980 and 1984, Xerox's profits decreased from $ 1.15 billion to $ 290 
		million (Refer Exhibit I). In 1982, David T. Kearns (Kearns) took over 
		as the CEO.  
		 
		He discovered that the average manufacturing cost of copiers 
		in Japanese companies was 40-50% of that of Xerox. As a result, Japanese 
		companies were able to undercut Xerox's prices effortlessly. Kearns 
		quickly began emphasizing reduction of manufacturing costs and gave new 
		thrust to quality control by launching a program that was popularly 
		referred to as 'Leadership Through Quality.'  | 		
	 
 
As part of this quality program, Xerox implemented the 
benchmarking program. These initiatives played a major role in pulling Xerox out 
of trouble in the years to come. The company even went on to become one of the 
best examples of the successful implementation of benchmarking. 
Excerpts >> 
 
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