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The Bhopal Gas Tragedy

            

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ALL'S NOT WELL WITH THE BHOPAL PLANT Cont...

In the autumn of 1983, Mukund ordered the shutting down of the principal safety systems in the plant. He felt that because the factory was no longer active, these systems were no longer needed. According to analysts Mukund did not pay heed to the fact that sixty tons of MIC were stored in the tanks. Interrupting the refrigeration of these tanks might possibly save a few hundred rupees worth of electricity a day, but it violated a fundamental rule laid down by UCC's chemists, which stipulated that MIC must in all circumstances be kept at a temperature close to zero degree celsius. In order to save coal, the flames which burnt off any toxic gases emitted into the atmosphere in the event of an accident that burned day and night at the top of the flare, was also extinguished. Other essential equipment, such as the scrubber cylinder used to decontaminate any gas leaks, were subsequently deactivated.

All this served as a signal for many well-trained and experienced engineers and operators to leave the Bhopal factory in search of more secure and satisfactory employment. Between one-half and two-thirds of the skilled engineers who had worked with the plant right from the project stage had left the plant by 1983.

Analysts felt that the top officials at UCC were neglecting the Bhopal plant because they were no longer interested in it. The Bhopal plant was licensed to manufacture 5,000 tons of MIC based pesticides per year. However, peak production was only 2704 tons in 1981, which fell to 1657 tons in 1983. Thus the quantity of pesticides manufactured in 1983 was only 33.14% of its licensed capacity.

In the first ten months of 1984, UCIL's losses amounted to Rs. 50 million. UCC planned to close the plant and put it up for sale. When no buyer came forward in India, plans were made to dismantle the factory and ship it to another country. Negotiations to this end were completed by the end of November 1984. Financial losses and plans to dismantle the plant exacerbated UCIL's already negligent management practices.

THE TRAGEDY

On the night of December 2, 1984, during routine maintenance operations at the MIC plant, at about 9.30 p.m., a large quantity of water entered storage tank no. 610 containing over 40 tons of MIC. This triggered off a reaction, resulting in a tremendous increase of temperature and pressure in the tank. 40 tonnes of MIC, along with Hydrogen Cyanide and other reaction products burst past the ruptured disc into the night air of Bhopal at around 12.30 a.m. Safety systems were grossly under-designed and inoperative. Senior factory officials knew of the lethal build-up in the tank at least one hour before the leakage, yet the siren to warn neighbourhood communities was sounded more than one hour after the leak started. By then, the poisonous gases had covered an area of 40 sq.kms. killing thousands of people. Over 500 thousand experienced acute breathlessness, pain in the eyes, and vomiting as they inhaled the deadly vapours. They ran in panic to get away from the poisonous cloud that hung close to the ground for more than four hours. When people poured into hospitals by thousands, their eyes and lungs in burning, choking agony, the doctors called up the plant medical officer to find out what they ought to do. Dr Loya, UCIL's official doctor in Bhopal replied, "It is not a deadly gas, just irritating, a sort of tear gas." [7]

More...

UNION CARBIDE TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

THE SETTLEMENT

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:

EXHIBIT I THE SITE FOR THE PESTICIDE FACTORY

ADDITIONAL READINGS AND REFERENCES:

[7] It was five past midnight in Bhopal, Dominique Lapierre & Javier Moro, Full Circle Publishing, 2001.


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