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MAKEOVER OF BRITANNIA

            

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Case code-MKTG-006
Published-2001

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A PATH LESS TRAVELLED

DONNING A NEW LOOK- Page1

DONNING A NEW LOOK

                                         ......cont >>page 2
BIL then focused on its core biscuit brands- Marie, Thin Arrowroot, and Milk Bikis-which faced competition from similarly branded alternatives like Bakeman's English Marie, Milka Biscuits, and Priya Marie. In order to overcome the competition, BIL differentiated its brands by bringing them under the 'Eat Healthy, Think Better' banner and giving them clearly-defined positioning. For Milk Bikis, targeted at children, BIL launched variants like Milk Bikis Funland, which were animal-shaped biscuits.

Marie was renamed Marie Gold, and positioned as a tea-time biscuit. Thin Arrowroot was renamed Jacob's Thin, with its position as the low-calorie health biscuit reinstated. In 1999, BIL relaunched its low-calorie, high-nutrition brands-Thinlite, Cream Cracker, and Digestive under the Nutrichoice umbrella, targeting the fast-growing health-conscious segment. BIL seemed to be quick in gauging the rising demand for products in the impulse category of snacks (e.g. chips and chocolates). Accordingly, BIL came up with trendier products like Little Hearts, Pure Magic, and Chekkers, targeting the under-24 urban consumer, positioning them with statements they identified with.

For example 'Direct Dil Se' for Little Hearts, 'Full Of Taste And Fun' for Pure Magic, and 'For The Ups And Downs In Life' for Chekkers. In 1999, BIL had launched Snax, a line of ethnic snackfoods using low-fat oils and hygienic processes, in 3 variants: Calcutta Ka Chana Choor, Bikaner Ka Bhujiya, and Rajasthan Ka Aloo Bhujiya, with an eye on the almost Rs 1800 crore snack market in India. In the segment of 'breads' which contributed about 6% of the company's total revenues, BIL's presence was restricted to a few cities.

In the face of increasing competition, it decided to strengthen its bread business in the southern states and was seriously looking for acquisitions and manufacturing tie-ups in that region. It also planned to leverage the key strength of the daily distribution system of its bread business in its new ventures like milk.
With a view to boosting volumes, BIL also changed its packaging strategy by launching biscuits in small sachets. It launched the low-priced sachets, 'Tiger Tikis-nibblets' priced at Re 1-targetting the mass market. BIL simultaneously revamped its distribution channels, increasing its retail distribution network to more than 1.20 million outlets. To increase penetration, more than half of the new outlets serviced, were in the rural and semi-urban markets-a break from the past, when BIL's distribution was distinctly skewed towards urban India.

As part of its strategy to reduce its dependence on biscuits, BIL sought to diversify its product portfolio to include categories that fitted within its overall objective of transforming itself into a food company. BIL targeted segments where it had the potential of capturing either the number one or number two position. Said Alagh, " I am not into pioneering new eating habits. On the contrary, we want to capture the essence of the Indian consumer. So we will be entering only those areas which will form part of the daily eating habits of an Indian home and offer either high volume or high value."

Analysts felt that what BIL had done was to build on the company's already successful brand. With the basic motto of 'eat the BIL product you like, but eat,' the company provided the consumer with an option at all times of consumption (other than the main meals of lunch and dinner). The underlying philosophy was to provide 'tasty yet healthy' snacks that one could eat and drink throughout the day, in short, a product for each occasion and for every consumer.
BIL saw an opportunity in the dairy segment as it had only one large player, Amul. Its strategy was to build on the strong affinity that Indian consumers had for milk and milk products in its diary venture. BIL wanted to do in dairy products what it has done in biscuits: cover all segments. Said Alagh ''As with other large markets, we will seek to segment the market for dairy products too. This could mean that our portfolio will include premium brands, with a high degree of value-addition, as well as popular-priced brands that could add critical mass.''

BIL entered the dairy segment in 1997 with cheese and milk powder or dairy whiteners. By 2000, BIL captured about 35% of market share of the cheese market and 20% in the dairy whitener segment. It launched butter in 1998, flavoured milk, sub-branded 'zipsip' in tetra packs in 1999 and ghee in February 2000. The company relaunched its entire dairy business in late April 2000 by bringing it under the 'Milkman' name. The pricing, communication, package, design had all been revamped. The word 'flavoured' was dropped from the milk range, as research had shown that in India, the word 'flavoured,' connoted 'artificial' to consumers.

BIL's diversification reflected its parent, Danone's portfolio. Ever since it got control of BIL, Danone had been providing it technology in biscuits and pastries. Danone's biggest business, dairy products, was the driving force for BIL's diversification. However, dairy products accounted for a meagre 9% of BIL's turnover. But BIL hoped that was going to change. Said Alagh, ''In the next 3 years, we expect new businesses to contribute about a quarter of our turnover.''

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THE ROAD AHEAD

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